The Need to Talk Openly About Iran’s Nuclear Program

David Albright has been the single most effective writer, and Cassandra-warner, a veritable vox clamantis in deserto, about Iran’s nuclear project. While the Biden administration is doing everything it can to avoid dealing with the matter, Albright keeps reminding us that the danger is growing as Iran rushes pell-mell in its race toward being able to produce nuclear weapons and the ability to put them on a missile warhead.

His latest paper, written with Sarah Burkhard, was issued at the beginning of August. More can be found here: “We need a new discussion about Iran’s nuclear weapons work,” by David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, Institute for Science and International Security, August 6, 2024:

U.S. intelligence is shielding the Biden-Harris administration from having to take serious action on Iran’s nuclear program. For years, they clamored repeatedly that Iran was not “currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities that would be necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” Now, it has shifted slightly to Iran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” While hinting at nuclear weapon activities taking place, it is focusing on public Iranian statements and old news on Iran’s capabilities to produce weapon-grade uranium, while continuing to avoid any type of public discussion on what nuclear weaponization activities Iran may be undertaking and how long it would take Iran to produce a testable nuclear device if it started today.

Likely, because some uncomfortable truths would come out: Iran can do it way too quickly, and initial activities to build the bomb could be difficult to detect and could predate any effort to enrich up to weapon-grade at its enrichment plants.

Moving on from its mantra, which ties back to the unclassified 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), widely misinterpreted as Iran ending its nuclear weapons program in 2004 altogether, would require the intelligence community to take a hard look at that NIE, its definition of nuclear weapons programs, and see where Iran fits with its nuclear weapons preparatory, or “on-demand,” program, a scenario not considered in the NIE.

While briefly uncomfortable, this discussion is desperately needed. It is time for U.S. officials to face the Iran nuclear situation as it is….

We need a new, honest public discussion on Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities and the technical and diplomatic structure Tehran has put in place that would allow it to quickly build nuclear weapons while the United States is paralyzed in its attempts to avoid a crisis.

We need it so the U.S. administration can start acting accordingly. The discussions between U.S. and Israeli intelligence on potentially weaponization related activities being conducted in Iran have to take place. They cannot become casualties of other events, be delayed, or undermined by secret U.S.-Iran correspondence.

So when Iran comes to the negotiation table, it knows the U.S. officials have their eyes wide open; their eyes on the prize: An end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program as it stands, verified by the IAEA.

And if Iran doesn’t come to the table, decides to go for the bomb, and Israel, likely with U.S. support, has to strike – at least the public at home and abroad will understand why.

In a well-ordered world, the lucid, thoughtful, quietly brilliant David Albright would be given a Cabinet-level post. His paper above should be distributed to the political and military leaders in the member states of NATO, to all members of Congress, the Pentagon brass, and the mainstream media. Remember, it will now take only days for Iran to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. Some things can wait. This can’t.